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Since the 1994 constitutional reform, a group of lawyers, public defenders and societal 
organizations have turned to the courts in search of new spaces for participation in the pursuit of 
social change. To this end, they have increasingly promoted public interest litigation,1 defined as 
a judicial claim in the form of an individual or collective lawsuit that seeks the structural 
transformation of state institutions to promote the respect of rights and democratic values 
established in the Constitution.  
Even if the employment of this strategy of suing the state and its agents is still at an 
embryonic stage,2 its development provides an interesting framework to discuss a few of the 
issues set forth by this panel’s organizers relating to the possible contributions law could make to 
a reformist agenda. In particular, I want to explore an aspect of the new public interest litigation 
embedded within the domestic sphere: the model of judicial remedies crafted against state bodies 
in the struggle for structural reforms, and the role of these remedies in the definition of the 
objectives and styles of judicial intervention in public administration. 
                                                 
* Estudiante de doctorado (JSD), Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Stanford. This is a translation of the paper 
presented at SELA 2005 that does not include modifications made following the seminar discussions. The Spanish 
version, also available on this site, is the definitive version. 
1 En Argentina es usual referirse a esta nueva estrategia como litigio de “derecho de interés público.”  En este 
trabajo, sin embargo, he preferido utilizar la expresión “litigio de derecho público” para acotar la discusión a la 
variante del litigio de impacto frente a instituciones de la administración pública con las características descriptas en 
el clásico trabajo de Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,” 89 Harvard Law Review 
1281 (1976). La definición y el alcance de la práctica de litigio de interés público han sido objeto de varias 
discusiones prácticas y teóricas. Véase por ejemplo, Volúmenes 7, 8, y 9 de los Cuadernos de Análisis Jurídico de la 
Universidad Diego Portales (1998, 1999, 2000); Martín Bohmer, “Sobre la Inexistencia del Derecho de Interés 
Público en la Argentina,” Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de Palermo, V. 3:1 (1997); Mary McClymont & 
Stephen Golub (ed.), Many Roads to Justice, The Ford Foundation, 2000; o Mark Ungar, Elusive Reform: 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Sobre la producción 
más reciente, véanse  las publicaciones en Conecta Sur, disponibles en http://www.conectasur.org/es/item3a.php. 
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I will argue here that it is necessary to reorient existing discussions about the legitimacy 
and institutional capacity of judicial activism in public interest litigation toward the deliberation 
about the role and type of remedies that the judiciary could or should orchestrate to contribute to 
the democratization process, the strengthening of institutions, and the fight against poverty. 
With this objective, after a brief clarification of the concept of “judicial remedies” (Part 
I), I will present in a systematic fashion a few axes of the local debate about public interest 
litigation and law to point out its limitations and the necessity of reformulating it to include the 
remedial dimension of the lawsuit (Part II). 
I will then explore a few ideas to situate the discussion about judicial remedies within the 
local plane. I will begin with an illustration of the remedial style displayed by our courts in 
public interest litigation to date. To this end, I will review the judicial remedies ordered within 
the body of incipient judicial interventions in cases involving the right to health in circumstances 
of poverty (Part III). 
As the cases in which claimants were successful suggest, judicial remedies against public 
hospitals and state officials in charge of the health care system exemplify rudimentarily the 
traditional “command and control” model of intervention in public administration. Even though 
this type of intervention has positive aspects and has been successful at certain stages of impact 
litigation in jurisdictions like the United States, I will suggest throughout the rest of this paper 
that the particular developmental circumstances and institutional precariousness of Argentinean 
actors could be better suited to the use of judicial remedies of the experimentalist litigation 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Para un estudio del desarrollo del litigio en la forma de acciones colectivas, véase, Gustavo Maurino, Ezequiel 
Nino & Martín Sigal, Acciones Colectivas: Análisis Conceptual, Constitucional, Jurisprudencial, Procesal y 
Comparado, Editorial Lexis Nexis, Buenos Aires, 2005 (en prensa). 
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model for the destabilization of rights, as it was recently set forth by Sabel and Simon3 (Part IV). 
In addition to being better suited to the local institutional context, this model could offer more 
appropriate answers to the objections to impact litigation that are based on the lack of legitimacy 
or the judiciary’s institutional incapacity. The paper concludes with a few contributory 
suggestions to the debate over the judiciary’s remedial function, if it is to play a more effective 
role in the control of the administration in relation to structural inequality.  
I. A Terminological Clarification  
The Argentinean legal tradition does not have an equivalent to the U.S. legal system’s 
notion of “remedies.” Within the U.S. system, the concept of “remedy” refers to “the various 
types of instructions that courts order after being persuaded of the merits of a litigant’s claims.”4 
Judicial remedies5 include: (a) the determination of damages, be they monetary compensation or 
punitive damages; (b) the declaration of parties’ rights and obligations; and (c) a variety of 
orders denominated “injunctions” 6 that instruct the defendant to cease her damaging conduct or 
begin conduct required by law.7 In particular, this last type of order requires the existence of 
irreparable damages and the absence of other adequate remedies. Various types of injunctions 
have been identified. Within the possible taxonomies, some differentiate among injunctions: (a) 
preventative, geared toward avoiding future harms; (b) reparatory, reserved for the reparation of 
                                                 
3 Charles Sabel & William H. Simon, “Destabilizing Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,” 117 Harvard 
Law Review 1015 (2004). 
4 Subrin, Minow, Brodin & Main, Civil Procedure, Aspen Publishers, 2nd. ed., 2004, p. 5 (la traducción es mía). 
5 El desarrollo de este sub-tema del derecho procesal es tan amplio y complejo que suele estudiarse en cursos 
específicos y referirse como el “derecho de los remedios.”  Entre los materiales didácticos clásicos sobre el derecho 
remedial, véanse por ejemplo, Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution, Hornbook Series 
Student Edition, West Publishing Company; 2nd. ed, 1993; y Owen Fiss & Doug Rendleman, Injunctions, 
University Casebook Series, The Foundation Press, Inc., 2nd. Ed., 1984.  
6 Owen Fiss & Judith Resnik, Adjudication and its Alternatives: An Introduction to Procedure, Foundation Press, 
New York: NY, 2003, p. 29. 
7 Fiss & Resnik, op. cit., p. 5. La distinción fundamental entre los dos tipos principales de remedios, la 
compensación por daños y las injunctions, se remonta a la diferencia jurisdiccional entre los tribunales del common 
law y las equity courts existentes en Inglaterra desde la Edad Media y unificados en la primera mitad del Siglo XX 
en Estados Unidos. Fiss & Resnik, op. cit., p. 26. 
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past harms; and (c) structural, a term coined by public interest litigation, and deployed to 
reorganize social institutions. All of these may be temporary or permanent. 
 In our law, the principles of the Civil Code and procedural law contemplate the majority 
of the various remedies found in U.S. law and, in practice, judgments contain a determination of 
indemnification for damages, a recognition of rights and instructions to do or fail to do similar to 
the injunction. Medidas precautorias are also similar to the temporary or provisional orders 
featured in the common law. However, there is no conceptual equivalent to the U.S. legal notion 
of a remedy8; no comprehensive or specific body of procedural law, substantive law, literature or 
theoretical discussion about remedies; and of course no sociological studies of the remedies 
issued by Argentinean courts, their obstacles and their degree of effectiveness.9 Consequently, 
the treatment of issues linked to the courts’ remedial function—when they are addressed—is 
performed in a fragmented way within the various areas of the law and without contextualizing 
their procedural aspects. Within the sphere of public interest litigation, the issue is addressed in 
the vocabulary of the implementation of judicial decisions and the processes of judgment 
execution or the instruments of contempt, daily monetary sanctions (astreintes), and other 
sanctions available in cases involving the failure to comply with judgments.10 The lack of 
                                                 
8 La expresión “remedio” se utiliza en general en Argentina para referirse a procedimientos abreviados como el 
amparo o a los recursos de apelación y en especial, al recurso extraordinario al que se apela como “remedio federal.”    
9 En Estados Unidos el desarrollo doctrinario, teórico y sociológico sobre la función remedial de los tribunales se 
remonta a la relevancia que les asignaran Holmes y luego el Realismo. Según Holmes, lo importante es “what courts 
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious.” “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 461 (1897).  
10 En general, son quienes promueven el litigio de impacto quienes han demostrado preocupación por las 
dificultades para implementar decisiones judiciales ordenando a la administración determinadas conductas. En el 
caso de la implementación de las sentencias sobre derechos sociales, económicos y culturales, por ejemplo, Víctor 
Abramovich & Christian Courtis se han referido al tema bajo el rótulo de “emplazamiento del Estado a realizar la 
conducta debida” revisando jurisprudencia exitosa nacional e internacional y asumiendo que “la constatación de la 
obligación incumplida debe ser seguida por la manifestación circunstanciada de qué conducta o conductas debe 
realizar el Estado para garantizar o satisfacer el derecho violado.” Véase,  Los Derechos Sociales como Derechos 
Exigibles, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2002, p. 136. Sin embargo, estos autores no han discutido modalidades 
alternativas de la intervención remedial judicial más que la propuesta de la “manifestación circunstanciada” 
mencionada, y han preferido ofrecer además modalidades alternativas de formulación del reclamo jurídico como las 
que describen bajo la idea de “estrategias de exigibilidad indirecta.” Abramovich & Courtis, op.cit., p. 168. 
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empirical studies of the remedial designs used by the courts and of compliance with their 
components is a constant in the opportunities for inquiry that this issue presents.  
 These conceptual and empirical omissions and, in particular, the lack of 
conceptualization of “structural” remedies11 and others that are usable in the new plurilateral, 
amorphous, fluid, and provisional context of public interest litigation,12 become especially 
relevant at the moment of confronting arguments about the legitimacy and institutional capacity 
of judicial interference in lawsuits against public administrative entities. 
Because of this and because I believe that Argentinean law’s conceptual background does 
not suffice, throughout the rest of this work I take license to transplant the concept of judicial 
remedies to refer to the orders our courts give when plaintiffs’ claims are successful.   
II. Redefining the Debate: The Incorporation of the Discussion over the Judiciary’s 
Remedial Function. 
 For the moment, the problem of implementing judicial decisions in public interest 
litigation and, more concretely, the problem of the function and style of remedies, has been 
relegated within the local discussions13 to the legitimacy of judicial activism and the implications 
                                                 
11 El litigio desarrollado por el movimiento por los derechos civiles revalorizó los remedios al estilo de las 
injunctions y dio forma a lo que se dio en llamar “structural injunctions” o la  “civil rights injunction.” Según Fiss, 
“las órdenes estructurales reconocen la naturaleza burocrática del Estado moderno. Buscan proteger valores 
constitucionales frente a los riesgos planteados por las organizaciones burocráticas. (…) Estas órdenes son los 
medios que utiliza el juez para dirigir o administrar la reconstrucción de la organización burocrática.” (la traducción 
es mía) Cfr. Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & London, 1978.  
Entre los trabajos seminales que contribuyeron a la discusión de esta nueva figura remedial pueden citarse por 
ejemplo: Donald Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1977; 
, Owen Fiss, “The Forms of Justice,” 93 Harvard Law Review 1 (1979); Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell, 
“The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,” 93 Harvard Law Review 465 (1980);  Alan 
Gewirtz, “Remedies and Resistance,” 92 Yale Law Journal 585 (1983); Robert F. Nagel, “Separation of Powers and 
the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,” 30 Stanford Law Review 661 (1978); Peter Schuck, Suing Government, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, (1983). 
12 Chayes, supra nota 1, p. 1284. 
13 El lector argentino familiarizado con la precariedad de los intercambios académicos y los debates públicos locales 
considerará exagerada mi referencia a las “discusiones locales.” En diversos sentidos estas no existen realmente, por 
la falta de foros escritos y académicos en los que desarrollar los intercambios, por la ausencia de actores con 
dedicación suficiente, la precariedad institucional del marco en el que se dan los diálogos cuando existen, etcétera.  
Utilizo la expresión, en cambio, en referencia a una serie de trabajos que constituyen la escasa producción sobre el 
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of judicial resolution of socioeconomic rights cases on the one hand, and to the debate over the 
procedural tools used to implement the new litigation itself on the other. 
Like in the classic U.S. debates concerning the counter-majoritarian objection to judicial 
review that are based on the supposedly anti-democratic character of judicial intervention in 
lawsuits against branches of government constitutionally imbued with representativeness and a 
popular mandate, some have resisted a priori judicial intervention and the judicialization of 
claims that they consider should be resolved by Congress or by public administrative bodies.14 
The lack of legitimacy of judicial intervention lies, according to various positions, in the 
violation of principles like the separation of powers15 or of values like self-governance.16 
 Another aspect of our debates over the role of judicial power in the realization of 
constitutional rights has revolved around the interpretation of an egalitarian principle of 
constitutional roots and the status of social, economic and cultural rights, centering on the role 
that constitutionalization of these principles imposes on courts.17 Arguing against those who 
object to judicial activism, the participants in these discussions have generally advocated for 
active judicial intervention in the protection of social rights, justifying the justiciability of rights 
traditionally considered  “programmatic” or “aspirational” and, as such, devoid of judicial 
protection. For those who advocate for this active judicial role in the protection of all 
constitutional rights without differentiating among categories, the moral implications of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
tema localmente y que, en general, son partícipes de diálogos transnacionales con fuentes y actores estadounidenses, 
europeos  y, en ciertas ocasiones, latinoamericanos. 
14 Roberto Gargarella, La Justicia frente al Gobierno, Ariel, Barcelona, 1996.  
15 Los argumentos deferentes al Congreso o la administración pública basados en la separación de poderes suelen 
preponderar en las decisiones judiciales.  
16 Roberto Gargarella, op. cit., supra nota 14. 
17 Varios autores se han manifestado contra argumentos conservadores que niegan la exigibilidad de derechos 
sociales. Véase por ejemplo, Carlos S. Nino, Fundamentos de Derecho Constitucional, Astrea, Buenos Aries, 1992; 
Carlos S. Nino, “Los Derechos Sociales,” en Derecho y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1993; Marcelo Alegre, 
“Democracia, Igualitarismo y Activismo Judicial,” en Los Derechos Fundamentales, SELA 2001, Editorial del 
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equality principle in the definition of the substantive content of rights, or the terms of postulation 
of social, economic and cultural rights, support the judicial obligation to intervene.   
Finally, it is possible to identify another group of local discussions relevant to the 
definition of the courts’ role as a space of social transformation. These have considered the 
development of procedural tools necessary to the stimulation of judicial action in the protection 
of rights, and of institutional reforms that contribute to the strengthening of the country’s 
democratic transition process. Since the 1994 constitutional reform, both judicial decisions and 
doctrinal exchanges have emphasized the interpretation of the constitutional principle that 
established the class action lawsuit (amparo colectivo) as the new summary procedural 
mechanism for the protection of collective rights.18 These exchanges have considered diverse 
criteria for the definition of active legitimization required by the amparo colectivo and its 
eventual regimentation, with special attention to the rights of those unrepresented in the process, 
to the collective effects of judgments, to the regulation of attorneys’ fees and costs, and to the 
creation of mechanisms that incentivize respect for judicial decisions.19 These discussions have 
also incorporated the need to develop ordinary procedural resources in the style of class actions20 
to manage collective processes in a more just and efficient way. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2002; Christian Courtis, “Los Derechos Sociales como Derechos,” en Los Derechos 
Fundamentales, op. cit.; y Abramovich & Courtis, op. cit. 
18 Sobre las discusiones locales sobre el tema, véase, Néstor P. Sagues, Elementos de Derecho Constitucional, 
Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1999, tomo 2; Daniel A. Sabsay, “El amparo como garantía para la defensa de los derechos 
fundamentales,” Rev. Jur. del Centro de Estudiantes, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Buenos Aires. No 6., 
1996; y los capítulos de Raquel Asensio, Mariela Belski y Mariela Puga en Documentos de Trabajo sobre Derecho 
de Interés Público,  Programa de Derecho de Interés Público, Universidad de Palermo, 2001-2003.  
19 Abramovich & Courtis, supra nota 10. 
20 Ezequiel Nino,  Informe sobre Acciones de Clase,  Documento de Trabajo sobre Derecho de Interés Público, 
Programa de Derecho de Interés Público, Centro de Estudios de Postgrado, Universidad de Palermo. Agosto 2002.  
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  However, the three lines of argument set forth assume three types of unviable separations 
that impoverish and constrain the practical implications of the debate over the judiciary’s role.21 
First, the positions identified assume that the discussion about the legitimacy of judges’ control 
over suits against the state can be separated from the analysis of what judges can or should do to 
control administrative conduct.  These positions assume a rigid attribution of constitutional 
functions to the three branches and then present the judicial power as interfering with the powers 
clearly attributed to the other branches, instead of recognizing the complexity of inter-branch 
relations in their daily operation and the advantages of a dialogical interaction that assumes the 
blurring of strict functions that is conducive to practices that promote dialogue and 
interdepartmental deliberation. On another front, those who point to the costs of judicial 
intervention in terms of affecting self-governance seem to reject a priori the inclusive and 
deliberative possibilities of collective judicial proceedings and of various participative remedies 
that contribute to the democratic legitimacy of judicial decisions.  
The second type of argument, based on the problem of interpreting rights, also assumes 
the possibility of discussing the definition of the content of these rights without addressing its 
implications for remedies. That is to say, it presumes a qualitative separation between the idea of 
rights and the idea of remedies, instead of the bidirectionality between the two concepts that is 
necessary to keep in mind in order to reciprocally delimit their reach.22 Or likewise, as Levinson 
                                                 
21 En esta sección sólo expongo brevemente el problema de presuponer esta separación entre derechos y remedios ya 
que mi intención aquí es señalar lo incompleto de los tres ejes de debate mencionados hasta aquí. Para más detalles 
sobre las relevancias de la consideración de la interrelación entre derechos y remedios en cada uno de estos tres 
niveles de argumentación, véase la bibliografía citada en la nota 11. 
22 Para un desarrollo más completo de la crítica a diversas visiones de la interpretación judicial de derechos que 
ignoran o minimizan el rol remedial de los tribunales, véase, Daryl J. Levinson, “Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration,” 99 Columbia Law Review 857 (1999). La propuesta de Levinson frente a las teorías que amplifican 
las distancias y diferencias entre derechos y remedios es la del “equilibrio remedial.” Este equilibrio comienza por 
reconocer que los derechos y los remedios están inextricablemente relacionados al igual que lo están en otras áreas 
del derecho como el derecho de propiedad, la responsabilidad extracontractual o el derecho contractual, en las que la 
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has suggested, 23 this argument is guilty of an “an essentialist attitude toward rights”24  resulting 
in the negation of the need to understand the symbiosis of the right-remedy pair to define the 
reach and the forms of judicial adjudication of rights themselves. This omission is all the more 
striking in public interest cases in which parties pursue structural reforms for which the courts’ 
remedial function is central to the very definition of the violated right. If rights have been 
designed to function in the real world, their content is inextricably linked to pragmatic 
considerations about their justiciability and operation. 
Lastly, the third camp, those concerned about better procedural design, presupposes the 
plausibility of designing complex judicial proceedings—proceedings far removed from the 
traditional litigation model as a forum for the resolution of bipolar controversies—without 
evaluating the judicial remedies that could be required within the framework of new procedural 
methods.25 Procedural alternatives are discussed with little or no consideration for the type of 
remedies that are better and more effectively accommodated to the characteristics of the new 
collective and, generally, summary processes. As a result, the role of parties, like the role of 
judges, tends to be omitted in the formulation of proposed remedies, as do aspects of their 
provisionality, urgency and transparency, among others. 
The limitations pointed out are only a few of the reasons that justify the need to refocus 
debates about the judiciary’s role in public interest litigation on the remedial aspects of the 
judicial function in this litigation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
relación es reconocida hace tiempo según los términos de Calabresi y Melamed en su renombrado “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Catedral,” 85 Harvard Law Review 1089 (1972). 
23 Daryl J. Levinson, op. cit., p. 861 y siguientes. 
24 “Rights essentialism,” en inglés. 
25 La diferenciación en el derecho estadounidense de las acciones de clase de la Regla 23 según el tipo remedial que 
algunas alternativas requieren ilustra la centralidad del aspecto remedial en el litigio colectivo. Véanse, la distinción 
entre acciones de clase de los puntos b.2. y b.3 de la Regla 23 de las Normas Federales de Procedimiento Civil. 
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III. An Exploration of Actual Remedial Practices 
A debate that incorporates this remedial dimension should nourish itself from the 
experiences that have developed to date in Argentina and other jurisdictions. To this end, let us 
turn to certain features of existing remedial practice in the area of the right to health.  
(a) Public Interest Litigation involving the Right to Health. Faced with growing public 
interest litigation brought by ombudsmen, societal organizations and individuals,26 judges have 
reacted by using various innovative remedies that include, for example, orders to redesign 
gender-segregated living arrangements in a public teachers college,27 provision of daycare 
services to female police employees,28 or penitentiary administrative reform.29  
 Neither a sociological study nor official information exists that describes the spectrum of 
measures ordered by the courts, compliance with them, or the practical effect that these new 
remedial solutions have had on the modification of lawsuits against the state and its agents, and 
on the effective exercise of plaintiffs’ rights. Even though this sort of inquiry is beyond the scope 
of this paper, a preliminary exploration of the remedies ordered in cases alleging a violation of 
the right to health illustrates public interest litigation’s preliminary transformation of the 
judiciary’s traditional remedial function. 
As is known, the national and local public health systems have suffered a progressive 
deterioration over the last few decades. This deterioration accelerated in the nineties and reached 
a high point during the months that followed the December 2001 crisis.30 The situation in public 
hospitals and the provision of treatments and medicine to the poorest and marginalized sectors of 
                                                 
26 Gustavo Maurino et al., op. cit., supra nota 2. 
27 Fundación Mujeres en Igualdad v. Gobierno de C.A.B.A. [cita] 
28 [completar cita] 
29 [completar cita] 
30 Julieta Rossi, “El Colapso del Sistema de Salud,” en Derechos Humanos en la Argentina, Informe 2002-2003, 
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Argentina, 2003, p. 377. 
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the population have for years made clear the crude effects of the state’s reversal in its fulfillment 
of its function as the guarantor of the constitutional right to health.31 In the context of this 
process, various actors have resorted to the federal and local courts to demand remedies against 
omissions or exclusionary actions on the part of state bureaucracies and public hospitals. The 
judicial decisions that were generated called attention to the incremental phenomenon of 
society’s organized effort against the health problem,32 and to the incorporation of the lawsuit 
into the mobilization toolkit.33 On the other hand, from the perspective of remedies, the 
judgments presented in legal publications34 show a variety of judicial orders of action or 
omission with various degrees of judicial interference in the management of public 
administrative agencies. 
 (i) Medical Treatments and Medicine. 35 On some occasions, judges have ordered state 
agencies to deliver or avoid interruptions in the delivery of medicine and medical treatments. For 
instance, in Asociación Benghalensis36 a majority of the Court, faced with a claim of a group of 
organizations dedicated to the defense of AIDS and HIV-positive patients, upheld the orders of 
the National Ministry of Health and Social Action (NMHSA) to “duly fulfill its obligation to 
assist, treat, and, especially, supply medicine—in a regular, timely, and continuous way—to 
                                                 
31 Rossi, op. cit., p. 378.  
32 Los reclamos alcanzan también a las prestadoras privadas del servicio de salud. Sin embargo, no me referiré aquí 
a ese ámbito del litigio que también ha alcanzado proporciones significativas en los últimos anos.   
33 Para una descripción más completa de varios de estos casos, véase, en general, el “Informe sobre la Situación de 
los Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales en la Argentina” E. Contarini, C. Fairstein, J. Kweitel, D. Morales, J. 
Rossi, en Los Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales: Un Desafío Impostergable, IIDH, Costa Rica, 1999, p. 
25-176; y Abramovich & Courtis, op. cit., supra nota 10, p. 139 y siguientes. Véanse asimismo, los capítulos sobre 
derechos económicos, sociales y culturales en informes anuales del CELS, 2000 y 2001.  
34 Dadas las limitaciones en la publicidad de las sentencias judiciales de tribunales locales y federales inferiores a la 
Corte, considero sólo los casos difundidos en revistas jurídicas como La Ley y Jurisprudencia Argentina, o citados 
en los informes mencionados del CELS.  
35 No revisaré aquí las decisiones en cuestiones de salud sexual y reproductiva como por ejemplo, Portal de Belén  
(declarando inconstitucional la aprobación administrativa de una variedad de anticonceptivo de emergencia) ya que 
los remedios desplegados no se relacionen a la provisión de tratamientos o medicamentos o la infraestructura 
hospitalaria. Sin embargo, en investigaciones futuras será importante contemplar el rol del género en el litigio de 
derecho público y en aquel sobre la salud, en particular. 
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[AIDS and HIV] patients that find themselves registered in the nation’s hospitals and health 
clinics.”37 Likewise, in Campodónico de Beviacqua,38 a majority of the Court ratified the 
national government’s instruction to continue, “with the urgency and the timeliness that the case 
demands,” the delivery of the treatment for Kostman’s Syndrome through the National 
Antineoplastic Drugs Bank—a delivery that had been suspended by the NMHSA.39 In another 
case brought by the Multiple Sclerosis Association,40 the Court ordered the NMHSA to 
reincorporate coverage under the Obligatory Medical Plan (OMP) of the treatment for multiple 
sclerosis patients and those suffering from a rare demyelination syndrome that does not produce 
symptoms or exacerbations for two years.41 
In lower courts’ final decisions we also observe the emission of orders that obligate 
public agencies to remedy prejudicial practices or omissions in the delivery of medicines and 
treatments. By 1997, the Bahía Blanca Civil Chamber had ratified the provincial government’s 
requirement that the necessary treatments for 34 AIDS patients in two local hospitals be 
continually delivered.42 Likewise, in A., C.B. v. MSAS,43 the national government’s order to 
supply medicine to extend an AIDS treatment in “regular, timely, and continuous fashion” was 
upheld. 
                                                                                                                                                             
36 Asociación Benghalensis y otros v. Estado Nacional, C.S.J.N., 1/6/2000, Fallos 323:1323. 
37 Considerando 4º.  
38 Campodónico de Beviacqua, Ana v. Estado Nacional, C.S.J.N., 24/10/2000, JA 2001-I-464. 
39 Esta vez, la Corte rechazó los argumentos del Estado apuntando a la responsabilidad primaria de la obra social a la 
que pertenecía el demandado y la provincia de su residencia, ya que la obra social no se encontraba “en condiciones 
de asumir la regular cobertura de la medicación necesaria para el tratamiento del niño,” la situación de precariedad 
laboral y económica de la familia y el estado de extrema urgencia. 
40 Asociación de Esclerosis Múltiple v. MSASN, C.S.J.N., 18/12/2003, Sup. Const. 2004, 30 – JA 12/04/2004. 
41 Este tratamiento había sido excluido del PMO por una resolución ministerial del 2001. 
42 C., C. y otros v. Ministerio de Salud de la Pcia. de Buenos Aires, Cám.Civ.yCom.BahíaBlanca, Sala II, 2/9/1997, 
LLBA-1997-1122. 
43 Cám.Nac.Cont.Adm.Fed., Sala IV, 9/3/1998, LL 1999-C-86. 
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Also in the renowned Viceconte44 case the appeals court: (a) ordered the federal 
government to comply “strictly and without delay” with the legal stages of the production 
schedule of the vaccine for the mal de los rastrojos,45 under the threat of making the Ministers of 
Health, Economy and Labor, and Public Services personally responsible; (b) notified the 
President of the judgment; (c) charged the National Ombudsman with oversight and control of 
the fixed schedule; and (d) finally, required that the plaintiff inform the court about compliance 
with the production schedule. Similar orders were given by the courts when reviewing 
preliminary injunctions in cases like the Supreme Court’s Barría.46 
 During the hectic months at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, there were 
various interruptions in government programs’ delivery of medicine that were linked to 
administrative problems with the purchase and importation of drugs, and to the precarious 
management of a public administrative apparatus that mirrored the abrupt changes in the 
Presidency. During 2002, the increase in lawsuits demanding medicine was exponential.47 In the 
preliminary injunction issued in the A.V. y otros c. MSASN case,48 for example, a judge ordered 
the Ministry of Health to implement “immediate provision” of the medicine used in the AIDS 
Program and the adoption of a two-day plan of measures necessary to “regularize and maintain 
the successive supply” of medicine. Upon reviewing the delays after the issuance of his order, 
this same judge applied economic sanctions to exact compliance. A similar order was given in a 
                                                 
44 Viceconte, M. v. Estado Nacional, C.Nac.Cont.Adm.Fed., Sala 4, 2/6/1998, JA 1999-I-485. 
45 Enfermedad endémica de una zona del sur de la provincia de Buenos Aires. 
46 Barría, Mercedes y otro v. Pcia. de Chubut, C.S.J.N., 18/12/2003, La Ley 7/4/2004, (medida cautelar ordenando 
la continuación de un servicio de diálisis). 
47 Según informes de la Cámara Civil y Comercial Federal, entre diciembre de 2001 y marzo del 2002 se 
presentaron en la Capital Federal más de 200 amparos por interrupciones de suministro de medicamentos. Julieta 
Rossi & Carolina Varsky, “La salud bajo la ley del mercado,” en Informe de Derechos Humanos 2002, CELS, Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 2003, p.346. 
48 Juz.Civ.Com.Fed. No. 7, citado en Rossi, supra nota 30, p. 398. 
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case involving the provision of medicine used to treat tuberculosis,49 and in other cases courts 
ordered the delivery of medicine to epileptic patients.50   
(ii) The Organization of Hospitals and Health Clinics: In another series of decisions from 
various jurisdictions throughout the country, judges have intervened remedially in the 
administration of hospitals and other health services. In Defensoría de Menores Nro. 3,51 for 
example, a Neuquén appeals court confirmed a provincial government order to create or 
permanently pay for three nursing positions when hiring personnel for a pediatric intensive care 
unit in the local hospital. Similarly, in Colegio de Médicos de la Pcia.  de Buenos Aires,52 a 
judge in Mar del Plata required the provincial government to: (a) fulfill the legal mandate to 
decentralize local hospitals within 180 days of being notified of the judicial decision, (b) notify 
the officials designated by the executive branch to implement judicial decisions, (c) prepare 
budget estimates within the rubric of decentralized entities for the next fiscal cycle, (d) provide 
in a constant and immediate manner hospital supplies, medicine, medical personnel, and 
assistants necessary for the normal functioning of hospitals, and (e) insure that $20,000 remain in 
each hospital’s safe for the purchase of supplies and medicine.  
Also in Asociación de Médicos Municipales de Buenos Aires v. Gobierno de la Ciudad,53 
the Buenos Aires appellate court upheld part of a trial court’s judgment that instructed the local 
government to hire medical personnel to resume the normal functioning of the histopathology 
unit of the General Hospital for the Acutely Ill, which had seen its personnel reduced from three 
to one, resulting in delays in securing diagnoses. To this end, the judges required the government 
to “marshal the funds conducive to maintaining the normal functioning of the histopathology 
                                                 
49 Juz.Civ.Com.Fed. No. 7, 21/10/2002, citado en Rossi, supra nota 30, p. 401. 
50 Defensora del Pueblo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires v. GCBA, 17/7/2002, citado en Rossi, supra nota 30, p. 402. 
51 Cám.Civil de Neuquén, Sala I, 10-/3/1998, Expte. 77/ca 1998, citado en CELS supra nota 33. 
52 Trib.Crim. Nro. 3 de Mar del Plata, 4/6/2002. 
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unit…[and] provide the necessary specialized personnel needed to conduct exams…in a timely 
and quick fashion for the treatment of disease.”54  
Finally, in a preliminary injunction granted in the N. H. Tarrio y otros55case, a judge 
ordered the regular delivery of supplies and medicine, and the repair of buildings and urgent 
instrumental material of certain units of the Eva Perón Interzonal Hospital for the Acutely Ill. 
The measure was subsequently confirmed in judgments entered against the provincial Minister of 
Health and the provincial governor.56 
 (iii) Environmental Conditions for the Exercise of the Right to Health. On other occasions the 
courts have adopted remedial measures consistent with orders to act when the right to health of 
ill children and adults living in unhealthy conditions has been at play. For example, in the 
Menores Comunidad Paynemil57 case, the Neuquén Civil Chamber ordered the provincial 
executive branch to: (a) provide a daily supply of 250 liters of water to each inhabitant, (b) 
ensure that affected inhabitants would have their potable water within forty-five days, (c) within 
seven days, commence proceedings for the determination of the damages caused by the 
contamination of the water supply, and (d) adopt pertinent measures if damages were sustained, 
and necessary measures to ensure environmental preservation. More recently, in the same 
jurisdiction, a trial court judge58 instructed the provincial government to air-condition the home 
of a family with a girl who suffered from a grave illness. The judge also ordered the government 
to ensure that the neighborhood had potable water, heating, electricity, and a septic tank. The 
decision was appealed to the Neuquén Civil Chamber,59 which accepted the provincial 
                                                                                                                                                             
53 C.Cont. Adm.y Trib.Cdad.Bs.As., Sala 2, 22/8/2002, JA 2003-I-611. 
54 Considerando 13. 
55 Juz.de Gtías., San Martín, No. 2, Causa 5992. Citado en Rossi, supra nota 30, p. 383. 
56 Sentencia, 23 de agosto de 2002, citado en Rossi, supra nota 30, p. 383. 
57 Cám.Apel.Civ.Neuquén, Sala II, Expte. 311-CA-1997, citado en CELS supra nota 33. 
58 Defensor de los Derechos del Niño y Adolescente v. Pcia. de Neuquén. 
59 Cám.Apel.Civ.Neuquén, Sala II, 3/9/2002, LL 2002-F-477. 
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government’s temporary solution of transferring the minor and her family to a hotel until a home 
with the services required by the trial court’s judgment could be secured through the Provincial 
Housing Department. 
 This type of claim, however, has encountered negative responses on other occasions. 
Worth mentioning are two decisions made during the critical circumstances of 2002 when judges 
rejected right to health claims on the ground that their resolution was beyond judicial 
competence. 
 In the Ramos, Marta y otros v. Pcia. de Buenos Aires60case the majority of the Court 
denied the claim of a mother living in extreme poverty with her eight children for a subsidy and 
necessary assistance for, among other things, the transfer of one of her daughters to the Garrahan 
Hospital, where she was to undergo surgery for congenital heart disease and to where her mother 
could not transfer her because she (the mother) lacked a job, resources, and a sitter for her other 
children. In the case, a majority of the court found that the claim was “manifestly inadmissible” 
because impediments imposed by the defendants to frustrate access to the free and public 
hospital had not been accredited.61 The court also rejected its jurisdiction to evaluate “the control 
of the wisdom with which the administration carries out the functions that the law validly 
charged it with, or the reasonableness with which it exercises its own powers.”62 
 Toward the end of that same year, a court in Chubut let stand a trial court judgment63 that 
ordered the provincial government to furnish a health center with budgetary, human and 
organizational resources. According to the trial court judge, the health clinic lacked the necessary 
resources to provide milk to wet nurses and malnourished children, basic medicines and 
                                                 
60 C.S.J.N., 12/3/2002, JA 2002-IV-466. 
61 El Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de la Nación, la Pcia. de Buenos Aires y el Hospital de Pediatría Garrahan. 
62 Considerando 8º.  Curiosamente, esta decisión se dio en los mismos días de las decisiones de la misma Corte en 
defensa del derecho de propiedad de ahorristas en dólares invalidando  drásticas medidas financieras de emergencia. 
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personnel to attend to users of the service. However, through various formulations of the lack-of-
judicial-competence argument, the Chamber determined that the trial court’s judgment 
unjustifiably interfered with health care policy design and the province’s health care policy, and 
that these matters were “technical and scientific material alien to the capabilities of the 
judiciary.” 
(b) Preliminary Characterization of the Actual Remedial Model. The cases reviewed in 
which claims were successful are similar in structure to the morphology of public interest 
litigation classically defined by Chayes.64 In contrast to traditional bipolar litigation, the parties 
who bring these claims are plural and amorphous and include combinations of individuals, 
ombudsmen, and a variety of societal organizations that represent the “affected” in various 
degrees. In addition, the cases involve judicial interference in questions of the organization and 
operation of public administrative agencies in charge of subsidies and plans for the delivery of 
medicine and the management of hospitals. From the remedial perspective, the new type of 
litigation does not presume compensation for past limited harms, but rather a transformation of 
the future of institutional practices through the ad hoc design of solutions the consequences of 
which will exceed, in the majority of situations, the impact on the parties before a judge.65 
 The preeminence of remedial interventions in the form of orders to act or refrain from 
acting instead of an instruction to compensate for damages, and the multiple forms of 
interventions that judges seem to adopt, constitute one of the specific characteristics of this new 
type of judicial control over lawsuits against the government. 
Even if the cases involving the transformation of the health care system set forth modest 
objectives as compared to those of education and housing desegregation cases in the U.S., one 
                                                                                                                                                             
63 Martínez, Celmira y otros v. Chubut, Cám.Apels.NOEChubut, Sala B, 18/11/2002, JA 2003-III-510. 
64 Chayes, op. cit., p. 1284.  
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can discern within judicial orders features shared with the “structural injunctions” or “structural 
orders” of U.S. law. These remedial structures “seek to concretize the reorganization of a social 
institution”66 and through this organizational reform repair the harm that public agencies’ 
structure can produce when violating certain constitutional rights.67 
Judicial interference with the hiring of hospital personnel,68 the definition of the reach of 
a treatment and instructions for the provision of medicine,69 the residential relocations of 
families70 or the decentralization of public hospitals, for example, can be reinterpreted as 
incipient forms—and more limited than their U.S. equivalent—of judicial orders that seek the 
adjustment of administrative and hospital agencies to comply with the constitutional mandate of 
providing adequate health services. 
In the United States, where these structural orders are more developed, their evolution 
over the last forty years has undergone various stages. According to Fiss, during the first decade 
of civil rights litigation (1954-1964) the structural orders consisted of two parts: a broad 
prohibition (“no racial discrimination,” “no maintenance of a dual/segregated educational 
system”) and a requirement that school officials present a plan to transform the dual educational 
system into a racially unified one.71 In the litigation mentioned earlier, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                             
65 Chayes. op. cit., p. 1284-1315. 
66 Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction, supra nota 11, p. 9.  
67 Ejemplos de estos remedios estructurales incluyen, entre varios otros, el diseño de un sistema de traslados en 
autobús de estudiantes de una jurisdicción  a otra para la promoción de la integración racial y la redefinición de 
jurisdicciones residenciales; la instrucción de reformas en las condiciones de internación de pacientes con 
enfermedades mentales; la exigencia de cursos de entrenamiento para la educación de policías; y el desarrollo de 
códigos sobre la administración de prisiones con indicaciones sobre la infraestructura residencial, alimentación, 
vestimenta, bibliotecas, y las condiciones de trabajo, educación y servicios de salud de cárceles.  
68 Defensoría de Menores Nro. 3, supra nota 51; Colegio de Médicos de la Pcia.  de Buenos Aires, supra nota 52, 
Asociación de Médicos Municipales de Buenos Aires v. Gobierno de la Ciudad, supra nota 54. 
69 Asociación Benghalensis, supra nota 37.  
70 Defensor de los Derechos del Niño y Adolescente v. Pcia. de Neuquén, supra nota 58. 
71 Cfr. Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction, supra nota 11, p. 14:“La técnica de presentación de un plan al 
tribunal era un intento de lograr que los demandados –en lugar de los demandantes o el tribunal – especificaran los 
pasos remediales. Reflejaba la incertidumbre doctrinaria, (…); consideraciones estratégicas (…), y el deseo de 
capitalizar la experiencia del organismo a cargo de la administración de las escuelas (…).”  
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Argentinean judges seem to have preferred for the preliminary developmental stage of these 
orders a remedial intervention model with a slightly higher degree of specificity. This degree of 
intervention is more similar to the model of the more detailed decrees adopted by U.S. courts in 
the decades following 1964.72 In this way, and although less disaggregated and complex than the 
structural injunctions of this second stage, Argentinean judicial orders also exemplify a type of 
judicial intervention styled after the vertical regulation practice of “command and control”; that 
is to say, similar to administrative bureaucracies’ traditional forms of intervention when, from a 
central authority, they establish more delimited instructions.73  
IV. Toward a New Remedial Paradigm.  
(a)   The Experimentalist Litigation Model. According to Sabel and Simon, the last decade of 
U.S. public interest litigation has seen a turn from this last type of remedy toward 
experimentalist solutions that combine more flexible and provisional forms of regulation in 
which parties have more discretion and collaborate in an educational and reconstructive 
process.74  
 The observation of the transformation of remedial practices towards experimentalism 
within traditional areas of public interest litigation like the mental health system, schools, 
prisons, housing policy, and police abuse75 has led these authors to look to a new model of this 
type of litigation that operates as a “destabilizer of rights.” Following the Mangaberia Unger of 
                                                 
72 Owen Fiss, op. cit., p. 14. 
73 Sabel & Simon, op. cit. supra nota 3, p. 1019. 
74 Sabel & Simon, op. cit., p. 1019. 
75 Para los autores, esta transformación ha adoptado formas variadas en las cinco áreas de litigio señaladas. Por 
ejemplo, en el litigio reciente en cuestiones de educación se han aprobado planes desarrollados por las partes 
especificando resultados y procedimientos para la medición del progreso hacia los mismos (Vaughn G. v. Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore, citado por Sabel & Simon, p. 1026). Asimismo, en los casos de litigio en cuestiones de 
salud mental se han abandonado los decretos detallados de las primeras épocas por procedimientos en los que “las 
partes y expertos que ellas recomiendan, tienen la oportunidad real de hacer propuestas a las políticas sugeridas e 
iniciativas de entrenamiento antes de la adopción de las mismas, (…) y los demandados tienen que considerar 
seriamente tales propuestas.” (Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d. 7, 85, DDC 2001). 
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False Necessity, Sabel and Simon consider that this new version of public interest litigation has a 
destabilizing effect that “protects citizens’ interests in penetrating and opening large scale 
organizations or broad areas of social activity that remain closed to the destabilizing effects of 
ordinary conflict and that maintain the hierarchies of power and privilege intact.”76 
The “destabilizing effect” of the new public interest litigation is observed in two stages: 
the determination of responsibility or of a rights violation, and the definition of experimentalist 
remedies. In the ideal reconstruction of the experimentalist remedies model, Simon and Sabel 
review its three central features: (a) negotiation among stakeholders, (b) the continuous, 
provisional, and fluid character of remedial intervention, and (c) transparency.77  
 Defined liberally, the negotiation among parties and other interested actors is a central 
aspect of this new model. This negotiation can also include the participation of extrajudicial 
agents like special masters and mediators designated by a judge to coordinate deliberation until 
the establishment of an agenda and of dialogue rules between the parties.78 The deliberation 
between parties founded on the presentation of good faith reasons has the goal of reaching a 
consensus that renders a benefit to all those involved. Moreover, when this consensus cannot be 
reached, the established standards of dialogue constitute a fundamental contribution to the 
elaboration of a better remedial solution between the parties and, ultimately, between them and 
the mediators, extrajudicial officials, and the judge.79 Secondly, the flexibility and provisionality 
of remedial decisions appear as tools to fight the restrictions on available information in the 
design stage and the subsequent articulation problems of official lawsuits at the moment of 
                                                 
76 Mangabeira Unger, Roberto, False Necessity: Anty-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical 
Democracy, 1987, p. 530. 
77 Sabel & Simon, op. cit., p. 1067-1072. 
78 Se observa entonces una redefinición del rol de los clásicos special masters y funcionarios extrajudiciales que 
actúan como árbitros de la deliberación entre partes más que como ejecutores de instrucciones judiciales.  
79 Sabel & Simon, op. cit., p. 1068. 
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implementing remedial decisions.80 Thirdly, the experimentalist remedies model is characterized 
by its transparency; that is to say, the provisional terms negotiated by parties should be explicit 
and public, and ideally should be accompanied by an agreement about the measures and 
proceedings accessible to the public to evaluate their fulfillment.81 
(b) A Model to be explored in Argentina?  For Sabel and Simon, the new model of public 
interest litigation, and the type of remedial practice it presupposes, can be more effective in the 
induction of state compliance with legal obligations and more consistent with the structure of 
U.S. government. But is this model worth exploring for Argentina? It is possible to find 
arguments in favor of extrapolating these authors’ speculations to a context as different as ours?  
 I think that the experimentalist model, and particularly the underlying remedial style, can 
provide an innovative framework to expand our reflections over the quality and efficacy of 
public interest litigation. All of this, of course, while keeping in mind the speculative and 
provisional tone of our reflections, given the rudimentary development of the judicialization 
strategy of rights enforcement via lawsuits against the government, and the absence of an 
empirical understanding about the successes and limitations of the remedies used to date.  
Keeping these limitations in mind, it is possible that the remedial experimentalist model 
may offer more efficacious answers that will contribute to the debate about the judiciary’s lack 
of legitimacy and institutional capacity to issue structural orders in Argentina. Likewise, it is 
probable that this model will be useful in completing currently proposed procedural reforms.  
(i) Lack of Legitimacy. The justification of judicial control over public administration has 
been traditionally based on the failure to meet performance standards and on the violation of 
                                                 
80 Sabel & Simon, op. cit., p. 1070. 
81 Sabel & Simon, op. cit., p. 1072. 
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citizens’ procedural and substantive rights by state agents and bodies.82 In public interest 
litigation this classic justification of judicial review of administrative acts is joined by the 
inexistence of democratic mechanisms to access the administrative bureaucracy, or by the 
blocking of avenues of redress for disadvantaged groups in the political game of reaching these 
agencies.  It is this justification that has been controversial for those who question the legitimacy 
of judicial interference in the spaces reserved for politics and the majoritarian game.  
 The experimentalist model of structural orders responds to these objections by proposing 
a deliberative model in which the plaintiffs and public administrative officials negotiate the best 
possible solution under conditions of provisionality and transparency, and under the arbitration 
of a judge or his official delegates. This way, judges do not need to have the last word in the 
design of remedies. In exchange, parties and agents of the administration have the opportunity to 
participate with voice and vote, reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of judicial intervention in 
suits against the administration that originated within the framework of public interest litigation. 
To the extent that this deliberation is possible, the experimentalist model also recognizes the 
complex interaction between the powers and the patterns of its legitimacy, characteristics that the 
objectors to the legitimacy of judicial interference tend to avoid. 
 On the other hand, as Sabel and Simon note about the U.S. case, the transparency 
promoted by the experimentalist remedies model can pave the way for the generation of 
mechanisms that hold accountable plaintiffs and their lawyers, other representatives of affected 
individuals involved in the judicial process, and the judges themselves.83 In this way, a key 
component of the democratic legitimacy of other governmental branches that does not exist in 
the actions of judges or parties is incorporated into the sphere of litigation: the phenomenon of 
                                                 
82 Martin Shapiro,  Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration, The University of Georgia 
Press, Athens and London, 1988, p. 55.  
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settling accounts with the public or, at the very least, the potential of such a settling. At the same 
time, the model rejects the simplifying and formalist vision that presumes that the public 
administrative bureaucracy operates at all its organizational levels with the same levels of public 
accountability and therefore the same legitimacy enjoyed by political officials and by the 
president. 
 In the Argentinean case, the advantages identified could be aggregated into two particular 
aspects linked to the democratic legitimacy deficits of local institutions. On the one hand, in the 
context of institutional weakness that characterizes the three branches of Argentinean 
democracy, assuming that the democratic legitimacy of the legislative and executive branches 
over that of the judiciary are based on the idealized functioning of the majoritarian principle and 
the representative system would be naive.84 The hyperpresidentialist tradition, with components 
like the personalization of power, scarce transparency, and political instability—added to the 
distortions of the representative system—advise caution with respect to the presumption of 
irreproachable legitimacy of the political branches. If to this we add the political system’s actual 
conditions—over which a single hegemonic party rules and that, with the exception of a brief 
period, has had monolithic control over all the branches during the last fifteen years85—that    
presumption of absolute legitimacy seems to crumble quickly. 
 Clearly the judiciary also suffers from serious deficits of legitimacy, lack of 
independence,86 the public’s perception of a high degree of corruption and incompetence,87 lack 
                                                                                                                                                             
83 Sabel & Simon, op. cit., p. 1093. 
84 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” 5 Journal of Democracy 55 (1994); “Horizontal Accountability 
in New Democracies, en The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Andreas 
Schedler, Larry Diamond, y Marc F. Plattner, p. 29-51, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 
85 Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial Politics in Argentina, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2004, p. 53. 
86 Bill Chavez, op. cit., p. 26. Según Bill Chávez son indicadores de falta de independencia los oscuros procesos de 
designación de jueces del pasado, la violación de las garantías de inamovilidad e intangibilidad de salarios, la 
ampliación del número de jueces de la Corte, y la resistencia de los jueces a fallar contra el poder ejecutivo. Cfr. Bill 
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of diversity88 and the obvious limitations in the access to justice for wide sectors of the 
population.89 Against this background, a model of remedial intervention that supposes a dialogue 
between parties whose democratic legitimacy is not presumed appears as a better alternative to 
one that values the legitimacy of one branch over that of another, as does the “command and 
control” model that privileges a type of vertical, stricter judicial intervention. The creation within 
the judicial process of a space for inter-branch deliberation in which affected parties also 
participate can supplant the imposition of orders by a de-legitimated branch with orders issued 
by a fragile one that intends to strengthen and re-legitimate itself. 
 In addition, the role of transparency in the experimentalist model has additional value in 
an Argentinean context where mechanisms to access information and the channels for societal 
participation in the proceedings against the three branches of government are often inexistent or 
weak.90  
(ii)  Lack of Institutional Capacity. The questioning of the judiciary’s institutional capacity 
and efficacy in public interest litigation and of judicial participation in the issuance of structural 
reform orders has taken on many forms since the dawn of the development of these practices.91  
                                                                                                                                                             
Chávez, op. cit., p. 26. Véase también, Gabriel Negretto & Mark Ungar, “Independencia del poder judicial y estado 
de derecho en América Latina: Los casos de Argentina y Venezuela,” 4 Política y Gobierno 81 (1997). 
87 Véanse, estudios de opinión citados C. Nobini, Informe sobre Argentina, Vance Center, NY, Marzo 2004; Gallup 
Argentina, Estudio de Opinión acerca de la Administración de Justicia, La Ley, Buenos Aires, 1994. 
88 Me refiero aquí a la homogeneidad de su demografía, y, especialmente, a su composición sociocultural. Sobre este 
punto, véase respecto de los jueces de la Corte Suprema, por ejemplo, Ana Kunz, “Los magistrados de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia en la Argentina (1930-1990). 
89 Véase, Obstáculos y Limites al Acceso a la Justicia en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Servicios de Asesoramiento y 
Patrocinio Jurídico Gratuito en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Defensoría del Pueblo y  CELS, disponible en  
http://www.cels.org.ar/Site_cels/documentos/patrocinio_gratuito.pdf. 
90 [completar cita] 
91 Según algunas formulaciones de las objeciones basadas en la inefectividad del poder judicial: “[l]os tribunales 
saben bastante más sobre declarar derechos de lo que saben respecto de diseñar remedios, por lo cual deben dedicar 
mucho más tiempo para adivinar lo que podría servir para alcanzar los objetivos de los jueces. Los tribunales se 
ponen impacientes con esta etapa del caso. Quieren resolver las cosas de una vez y para siempre, incluso cuando han 
advertido que el caso les retornará de un momento a otro.” Donald Horowitz, op. cit., y en Robert Wood (ed.), 
Remedial Law: When Courts Become Administrators, the University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, (1990), p. 34. 
Asimismo, para Robert Katzmann: “Para la mayoría de los jueces la dificultad reside en que, por su entrenamiento, 
su preocupación no es la forma en la que operan las organizaciones. Muchos de ellos tienen sus experiencias en 
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In a possible disaggregation of the basic obstacles confronted by judges at the moment of 
designing and efficaciously imposing remedial structures, Shuck has identified, for example, the 
problems of information, power of communication, incentives, and the difficulty of obtaining 
political and public support for the proposed measures.92 In the litigation involving the right to 
health presented in Part III, these objections tend to take the form of health officials and hospital 
administrators questioning judges’ ability to know and manage the proposed impact of the 
parties’ demands93 and the effect of the unjust distribution of scarce resources in which the 
Argentinean state and its agencies operates.94 Within the judicial discourse, these arguments 
appear forcefully in the Ramos and Martínez95cases in which the judges seem to fearfully reverse 
course because of the perceived breadth of the task demanded. 
 It is probable that the empirical studies of judicial orders reviewed in Part III illustrate the 
existence of many of these limitations for the effective implementation of the remedies ordered 
by the judiciary. To overcome them, the negotiation, provisionality and transparency proposed 
                                                                                                                                                             
estudios jurídicos. La mayoría no tiene experiencia en la administración de burocracias.” Wood, op. cit., p. 35. Para 
una presentación de las limitaciones de la acción judicial con más matices y sustento empírico, véase, Rosenberg, 
Gerald, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991. 
92 Peter Schuck, Suing Government, supra nota 11, p. 154-169. Según Schuck, en primer lugar, las limitaciones en la 
información disponible para el juez al momento de dar forma a los remedios necesarios pueden implicar una 
restricción indudable en el diseño informado de un remedio adecuado. Muchas veces, además, la selección de casos 
testigos que asume el litigio de derecho público supone también la baja representatividad de los casos que llegan al 
tribunal. Por otra parte, cuando la etapa de implementación de un determinado remedio se extiende en el tiempo, es 
probable que las transformaciones sociales redunden en la modificación sustantiva de la información con la que 
cuentan los tribunales, a menudo, poco flexibles en la adecuación frente al paso del tiempo de sus propuestas 
remediales. Las restricciones en materia de información también se materializan en las dificultades de los tribunales 
para generar y procesar información sobre costos, beneficios, etcétera. Schuck, op. cit., p. 158.   
93 Véase por ejemplo, Asociación Benghalensis, Campodónico de Beviacqua, Colegio de Médicos de la Pcia. De 
Buenos Aires, citados en el punto III supra. 
94 Así, por ejemplo afirma el gobierno en Campodónico de Beviacqua, “la carga impuesta por el a quo compromete 
los recursos económicos disponibles para organizar los planes de salud, de acuerdo con lo previsto en la ley 24.156 
en detrimento de la población desprovista de cobertura medica que el ministerio tiene que proteger.” (Considerando 
8, Dictamen Procurador General de la Nación). también en Asociación Benghalensis, el Ministerio de la Nación 
alegó el riesgo de una intervención que afectara “la política de salud que compete al ministerio en el marco de la ley 
específica y en la organización de la distribución del crédito asignado por el Presupuesto Nacional. Máxime, por las 
proyecciones que para el futuro pueda tener la decisión que en definitiva recaiga y su incidencia en los legítimos 
intereses de la economía nacional.” (Considerando 6, Dictamen Procurador General de la Nación).  
95 Véase, supra notas 60 y 63. 
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by the experimentalist remedies model offer some particularly attractive answers in our 
context.96 This is so because, first, our public administration generates very little information for 
public policy design and, at the same time, judicial employees and judges tend to lack the tools 
and the preparation to process the information produced by administrative agents. The 
experimentalist proposal can be a strong option in the face of the caution of the institutional 
framework in which administrative public policy is implemented.97 In a similar manner, the 
possibility of revision of the remedies initially negotiated also appears as an interesting recourse 
against the rigidity of “command and control” remedies, which assume access to information and 
technocratic abilities that our judiciary is far from managing because of, among other reasons, a 
lack of understanding of the administrative bureaucracy’s internal workings.  
 Secondly, the experimentalist remedies style appears to be a possible means of 
surmounting the communication restrictions98 of judicial intervention through the involvement of 
these same administrative agents in the negotiation of a better judicial remedy. This would be so 
to the extent that a judge or a judge’s agent is not made an additional negotiator of public 
                                                 
96 Estas características del modelo remedial experimentalist pueden también servir para repensar aquellos casos en 
los que los jueces han rechazado la competencia judicial arguyendo dogmáticamente la imposibilidad de intervenir 
en el control del acierto o la razonabilidad de la actuación administrativa. 
97 Pablo T. Spiller y Mariano Tomassi ilustran algunos de los problemas de rigidez, incoherencia, volatilidad y baja 
calidad de las políticas públicas en cuestiones sociales, regulatorias y fiscales en los ejemplos presentados en “The 
institucional Foundations of Public Policy: a Transactions Approach with Applications to Argentina,” [cita] Señalan 
además los problemas estructurales que determinan la inexistencia de incentivos para la generación de una 
burocracia fuerte y entrenada. Por último, consideran también la ausencia de un control legislativo de la burocracia 
administrativa dada la baja calidad y falta de incentivos para invertir en formación y entrenamiento de muchos de 
los integrantes del legislativo. 
98 Al identificar las limitaciones del poder judicial para la emisión de órdenes estructurales, Schuck alerta sobre la 
incorporación de nuevos actores sin poder comunicacional a los numerosos rangos ya existentes dentro de la 
administración pública. Así, la incorporación del juez, o funcionarios por él designados, para supervisar la 
implementación de determinados remedios judiciales frente al accionar de la administración pública, tiene la 
potencialidad de agregar una o más capas y ejes de poder a un aparato estatal por demás estratificado y complejo. 
Schuck, op. cit., p. 161. Por otra parte, estos nuevos ejes de poder se caracterizan, según Schuck, por encontrarse 
alejados de su audiencia, estar a menudo deslegitimados frente a ella, y por ser pobres comunicadores en el mundo 
de canales y vericuetos de la administración pública.  
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officials that can question his ability to ultimately understand the problem in question and 
propose viable solutions. 
Third, the experimentalist remedies design could favor better administrative compliance 
with the result of the litigation. Because measures like contempt of court or the imposition of 
monetary fines on public officials are rarely used by Argentinean courts, the possibilities of 
inducing the compliance that judges rely on are reduced. Partly because courts recognize the 
precariousness in which the public administration operates and partly because they lack the 
legitimacy and power to exact compliance, the remedial model that involves administrative 
agents at the design stage could have the potential of elevating these agents’ compliance levels 
with orders generated within the litigation framework.  
Lastly, it is also probable that the dialogue generated between the parties and public 
officials in a remedial process in the style of the experimentalist model will generate a 
participative process that will strengthen the relations between societal organizations and public 
officials, which in turn could eventually result in more political support and social mobilization 
for the causes that public interest litigation tries to promote.  
These preliminary speculations lead us to believe that the theoretical and empirical 
explanation of the experimentalist remedies model could offer a positive framework for the study 
of the judiciary’s legitimacy and institutional capacity to intervene with structural orders in 
lawsuits against the government.  
V. A Few Proposals. 
 Many of those who work in the development of the country’s public interest litigation are 
conscious of the numerous difficulties in the embraced strategy. They think of it as just another 
tool to deploy along with coordinated action in other spaces of public participation, such as 
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politics or education. They know of the limits of “rights talk” and of its operation in the context 
of structural inequality, anomia, informalism and the precariousness of Argentinean democracy 
and institutions. They also do not ignore that, in these contexts, the law tends to operate as an 
instrument of oppression, and few cases in a de-legitimated forum like the judiciary can have 
more than a marginal impact on the centers of power targeted for transformation. However, 
without being naïve about the limits of tools like public interest litigation, they believe that the 
courts can be one more space from which to promote the construction of the rule of law and 
contribute to democratic deliberation, gradually and without giving rise to unattainable 
expectations.  
 It would be useful if future dialogues about the necessary conditions for a better 
deployment of the public interest litigation strategy would incorporate a consideration of the 
alternative remedies available. To do so, in addition to continue exploring possible models, it is 
necessary to produce more empirical quantitative and qualitative analyses about the remedies 
used to date and the relative efficacy of their impact on public administration. The litigation 
involving health issues can be a starting point, but areas like prison administration or the control 
of public services can also provide interesting fields of exploration. 
Empirical research should, in turn, serve to inform theoretical discussions and, 
eventually, legislative procedural reform proposals that improve the various existing remedies. 
The presence of legislators, lawyers, administrative and judicial officials, and civil society in 
these dialogues is key. In addition, spaces for legal education can play a fundamental role in 
accommodating these discussions and promoting legal and curricular changes that inform 
lawyers and judicial officials about the functioning of the administrative bureaucracy and vice 
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versa, and about the possible interactions between the administration, the judiciary and civil 
society. 
The experimentalist remedies model presents a few characteristics that recommend 
including it as a possible alternative in those debates, especially because of the cooperation and 
deliberation that it demands of parties within the framework of a mechanism directed by the 
judiciary. But it will also be important to consider possible objections to it, like the one that, to a 
certain extent, presupposes the blurring of the judicial function, or that requires confidence in all 
parties’ technical, negotiation, and dialogical capacity—and good faith—that cannot necessarily 
be assumed without more. Whatever the conclusion we arrive at, incorporating the remedial 
dimension to those discussions will make enriching our understanding of public interest litigation 
probable. 
